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Economic Development in Ravaged Haiti:
Is Democracy Really the Answer?
Barbara L. Bernier*
I. Introduction
On Sunday, December 16, 1990, in fair and peaceful elections,
the people of Haiti made what appeared to be a decisive change for
democratic rule and social justice. Newly-elected Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, Haiti's first democratically-elected president in more than
200 years, was a shining specter of hope for the Haitian people. A
new constitution had provided for a decentralized government, but
the enthusiastic vote for Aristide contrasted sharply with the vote in
the parliamentary races.
On September 30, 1991, a military coup ousted Aristide. Since
then, the 6,000-man Haitian army and police have carried out a
campaign of terror and intimidation against supporters of Aristide,
who was popular with Haiti's poor people.' In addition, more than
16,0002 refugees fled the island, mostly in response to the political
chaos and economic turmoil; the majority of those who escaped by
sea were intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard and held at Guanta-
namo Naval Station.
This article presents a historical framework of Haiti, discusses
past and present political events and their impact on the people of
Haiti, examines the economic conditions, explores the effect of both
Haiti's foreign policy and United States' foreign policy in response to
Haiti, analyzes the Haitian legal system, and offers critical sugges-
tions for a new order.
* Associate Professor, District of Columbia School of Law; B.A., 1971, State University
of New York at Plattsburgh; M.S.W., 1974 Adelphi University; J.D., 1978 Howard University
School of Law; LL.M., Temple University School of Law.
The author would like to thank Cecelia Perry for wonderful editing and research assis-
tance and the Haitian people for the inspiration. This article is dedicated to the memory, of
Mrs. Raymonde Bernier, a true Haitian lady who was the epitome of grace and beauty.
1. Hockenstaden, Cutters Return First 381 of Fleeing Haitians, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
1992, at All.
2. As of March 19, 1992, an estimated 16,464 Haitians had been interdicted. See Hai-
tian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541, 543 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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II. Recent Historical Events Affecting Haiti
A. United States Policy of Repatriation Upheld in Courts
The United States has responded to the recent difficulties facing
Haiti with a cool hand. On January 31, 1992, the United States Su-
preme Court authorized the Coast Guard to forcibly return about
10,000 Haitian boat people to their strife-torn island nation.' In a
brief order, the U. S. Supreme Court lifted a stay issued by U.S.
District Judge C. Clyde Adkins in Miami pending full resolution of
the legal issues.' The district court's stay prohibited the defendants,
the United States, from:
[F]orcefully repatriating the individual plaintiffs or class mem-
bers in their custody either until the merits of the underlying
actions are resolved or until defendants implement and follow
procedural safeguards adequate to ensure that Haitians with
bona fide claims of political persecution are not forcefully re-
turned to Haiti.'
The district court found that there was a substantial likelihood that
the plaintiffs (the Haitian refugees) would prevail on the merits
under the First Amendment right of association and counsel and
under Article 33 of the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to
Status of Refugees.
On appeal, the United States first argued that the Haitian refu-
gees had no enforceable rights under Article 33 since the Haitians
had not reached U.S. territory when they were intercepted at sea.
The United States further contended that even if the Haitian refu-
gees had a First Amendment right of access, the relief granted was
not related to their asserted rights.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and dissolved the
injunction, remanding it to the district court with instructions to dis-
miss on the merits the Article 33 claims."
The appeals court- subsequently issued another temporary re-
straining order (TRO) to consider the plaintiffs' claim under the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act (APA), which had been rejected earlier.
The court held-that it had jurisdiction to review the TRO and that
the stay of preliminary injunction was warranted due to a strong
likelihood that the government would prevail on the merits of the
APA claim.7 On February 4, 1992, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's stay, vacated all injunctions,
3. Baker v. Haitian Refugee Center, 112 S.Ct. 1072, (1992).
4. Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, No. 91-2653-CIV (S.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1991).
5. Id.
6. Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991).
7. Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 950 F.2d 685 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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and referred the case with instructions to dismiss because the com-
plaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 8
Despite. the Supreme Court's authorization, the Bush Adminis-
tration was reluctant to repatriate the Haitians, and consequently a
decade-old policy of promptly returning virtually all Haitian refu-
gees was temporarily broken. 9 The Bush Administration, however,
claimed that it feared an influx of an uncontrollable number of Hai-
tians coming into the country and resumed the repatriation."0 As a
result, on February 4, 1992, just four days after the U.S. Supreme
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's decision, the U.S. Coast Guard
cutters returned the first 381 Haitians." Many of the returnees, who
were denied political asylum in the United States, supported Aristide
and feared violence and prosecution.
B. United States Withholds Identities of Repatriated Haitians
In Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice,2 Haitians seeking po-
litical asylum sued to obtain information under the Freedom of In-
formation Act (FOIA) on Haitian nationals who had been returned
to Haiti. The Haitians argued that they were entitled to political
asylum in the United States because it was well known that, if re-
turned, they often faced prosecution. The district court ordered,
among other things, that the state department disclose the identities
of those redacted from the documents requested.' 3 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed.' 4 The Supreme Court reversed, how-
ever, holding that the Haitian nationals were not entitled to such
information since disclosure of the unredacted information would be
a clear invasion of the returnees' privacy.' 5
The United States' treatment of Haitian refugees is further il-
lustrated in the low percentage of Haitians granted political asylum
in comparison to percentages of immigrants from other countries.
For example, figures from the Immigration Naturalization Service
(INS) show that between 1981 to 1990, 22,940 Haitians were inter-
8. Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992).
9. On September 23, 1981, Haiti and the United States had entered into a cooperative
agreement to prevent the illegal migration of aliens from entering the United States. Interdic-
tion Agreement, United States-Haiti, T.I.A.S. No. 10241.
Under the agreement, the United States had authority to board Haitian flag vessels on the
high seas to make inquiries relating to the condition and destination of the vessels and the
status of those on board. If Haitian refugees were on board in violation of the agreement, the
agreement then called for the return of the refugees to Haiti. The agreement, however, did not
call for the United States to return to Haiti immigrants who may qualify for refugee status.
10. Kamen, Supreme Court Clears Way for Forced Return of Haitian Boat People,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1992, at A3.
11. Hockenstaden, supra note 1.
12. Ray F. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549 (1 1th Cir. 1990). •
13. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
14. Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549 (1lth Cir. 1990).
15. United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S.Ct. 541, 542 (1991).
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cepted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard. Of those, only 0.5% were
found to be eligible for political asylum. In contrast, during fiscal
year 1990, the United States allowed into the country 91.9% immi-
grants from China; 82.4% from the former U.S.S.R; 54.9% from
Romania; and 20% from Cuba.16
C. Haiti's Future
It is important for a nation's internal and external relations to
be firmly wedded to a strong rule of law. Considering the difficulties
Haiti has faced, one can only wonder whether Aristide's 'Lavalas'
(cleansing torrent) movement could have led Haiti to some kind of
orderly democracy. It is clear, however, that strict conservative mea-
sures must be employed to bring this impoverished nation to eco-
nomic freedom. To produce economic and political stability, Haiti
must enact a strong rule of law, which as in any civilized nation, is
based on the premise that the rule is accessible and fair. Absent laws
to establish'individual and property rights, a nation quickly falls into
anarchy. Law is the undergirding of a politically stable nation; it
binds a market economy and a political democracy. Through the dis-
cipline of the rule of law, a nation can prosper and operate effi-
ciently. Thus, it is important for a nation's internal and external re-
lations to be firmly wedded to a strong rule of law.
If Haiti is to turn around its present economic and political situ-
ation, it must consider ways to protect and promote liberty and prop-
erty. Furthermore, it must facilitate ways to achieve economic
growth, which is a complex undertaking since there is presently no
stable political and legal system. It is incumbent upon the people to
consider how much power should be entrusted to the government in
general and how much power will be allocated to administrative bod-
ies in particular. It will require the government and the people to-
gether to forge a mutually beneficial program. Once this framework
is established, the Haitian people will be able to consider successful
economic and democratic models.
If Haiti is to come into the twenty first century, it must first
chart its future, which will require installation of a president. This
process will also require consideration on the part of its leaders
whose chief purpose should be the good of the country. Further, the
Haitian people must find a way to address the recurrent class divi-
sions and decide the extent of governmental responsibility to the vast
majority of the population who are uneducated, have the lowest stan-
dard of living in the world, are undernourished, and are often
16. Randall Robinson, President of AFRICARE, Speech Delivered at the American As-
sociation of Law Professors Conference, Minority Law Professors Luncheon, Sunday, Jan. 5,
1992, San Antonio, Texas.
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fraught with medical problems. Additionally, through the rule of
law, the government must provide physical protection to its popula-
tion from the savagery of the Toni Mocoutes, a vestige of the
Duvalier regime, and encourage the return of those who fled in the
1950s and 1960s during the reign of Papa Doc and would gladly
return to their homeland to help rebuild and rekindle the spirit of
the nation. Finally, if the country is to grow and prosper, a coalition
of all classes and political groups must be formed. Once this frame-
work is established the Haitian people will be able to renew individ-
ual liberty and establish their place in the world as the proud and
prosperous oldest Black republic that it once was.
III. Historical Overview
A. Colonialization
When Christopher Columbus' Flagship Santa Maria was
wrecked in 1492, he discovered an island which he called La
Navidad. It subsequently became the New World's first Spanish set-
tlement. At the time of the discovery, the island had a large Indian
population, estimated to range from 200,000 to 1,200,000 people.1"
Within a century, European diseases, battles, and forced labor ren-
dered the indigenous population non-existent. Furthermore, when
France defeated Spain at the end of the fifteenth century, the two
countries signed the Treaty of Ryswick, which solidified France's ac-
quisition to that part of the island known as San Domingue.11
The San Domingue colony became an economic power for
France producing sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo, and providing
two thirds of France's overseas trade.' 9 It also provided employment
as well as supplied half of Europe's tropical produce.20 The colony
was also a great market for the African slave trade. The French phi-
losophy regarding slave labor was to work the Africans until they
died rather than encourage breeding among slaves. Importing new
slaves every few years proved a better investment because the initial
purchase could be amortized over four to seven years, providing an
eight to twelve percent return. 2' Thus, it was a better business strat-
egy simply to keep a slave alive for only a few years, overwork him,
17. The estimates of the indigenous population vary depending on the source. See LUN-
DAHL & MAT, THE HATIAN ECONOMY-MAN, LAND AND MARKETS, 69 (1983), also citing
COOK. SHERBORNE F. & BORAH, W., THE ABORIGINAL POPULATION OF HISPANIOLA IN ESSAYS
IN POPULATION HISTORY (1971).
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and merely replace him once he died.2
Thus, although the slaves managed to retain their religion, lan-
guages, cultures, customs, and pride, they harbored resentment at
the travesty of their condition. In one century, more than a million
Africans died in the intolerable condition of slavery. However, slav-
ery continued to thrive. While existing for even the briefest sojourn,
the slaves in Haiti created Creole, a distinct language based largely
on Norman French, to communicate; eventually the Dahomeanian
religion, though outlawed by the French, prevailed over all other Af-
rican religions to comfort the slaves in their wretched existence. 23
The French, recognizing that the African religions might pose a
problem, decreed that all slaves must be baptized into Catholicism.
The slaves' religious ceremonies were forbidden. Nonetheless the cer-
emonies took place:
The most famous of these meetings occurred at Bois-Cay-
man near Limbe, in the Plaine-du-Nord, over a long period dur-
ing the summer of 1791. The gatherings were led by Boukman,
a slave overseer and voodoo priest from one of the big nearby
plantations. Other overseers from other plantations in the north-
ern plains were invited. According to Robert and Nancy Hienl
in Written in Blood, when Boukman held his final ceremony on
the night of August 14, a pig was slaughtered, all present drank
the blood, and they swore allegiance on bended knee to
Boukman's cause, which was death to all blans, the Creole word
for white man, or foreigner. Legend has it that as the slaves
drank their potion, a vengeful thunderstorm broke out above the
meeting ground . . . . When the signal came forth from the
drums that night, slaves from half a dozen plantations rose up,
burned down their master's homes and slaughtered the planters
and their families . . . . After two months of fighting, more
than" a thousand plantations had been destroyed. The revolution
had begun.2 4
The struggle against slavery continued for 13 years. The guer-
rilla-style tactics of the slaves exhausted the French physically and
22. Id. at 10, 11.
23. The French attempted to prevent revolt by tribal mixing. However, the result was
the union of slavery under the powerful Dahomeans. Their religion was the most dominant and
within time most slaves were converted to it. Thus, the religion of Dahomey became the voo-
doo of Haiti. It became (through evolution the national religion that was secreted through the
images of the saints of Catholicism. For more on Haitian voodoo see M. DEREN. DIVINE
HORSEMEN: VOODOO GODS OF HAITI (1970); F. HUXLEY. THE INVISIBLES: VOODOO GODS IN
HAITI (1986); CL.R. JAMES, THE BLACK JACOBINS TOUSSAINT LOVERTURE AND THE SAN
DOMINGO REVOLUTION (1963).
24. A. WILENZ. THE RAINY SEASON 75-76 (1989) [hereinafter WILENZ]. Slaves who
had fled from the plantations and lived in mountain enclaves were very instrumental in the
uprisings. They were called Marrons, which, in French, means a domesticated animal that had
returned to its savage state.
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financially. Napoleon's initial plans to eliminate the Haitian uprising
swiftly failed, and was the beginning of the end of the French cam-
paign to colonize the New World. Subsequently, France sold its re-
maining stronghold in the New World, the Louisiana Purchase, in
1803 to the United States.2 5
Although the Haitians experienced unparalleled victory by be-
ing the only slave colony to become independent, the victory was not
accepted in the world community. 6 In addition, Haiti's failure to
participate actively in the world, was based on its inability to engage
in commerce. The United States, due to its own political position vis
a vis the slave economy, was active in blocking Haiti's entrance into
such commerce. 27 Thus, without the ability to develop economically,
Haiti was doomed to look back at its only shining hour: the success-
ful revolt against the French, and to languish in the past.
To complicate matters further, the once Black slave/white
master colony now had an added racial class, the Mulatto, which
served as a creation of force and control for the French slave master.
The exotic Mulattoes were never equal to the French planters.
25. Id. at 76. Napoleon had planned to make short shrift of the rebellious Haitians on
his way to establishing New Orleans as a beachhead for the French Army. From there, he
would continue his New World conquest until the French flag flew over all of North America,
not just the enormous region of Louisiana and some parts of Canada. Instead, unable to keep
Haiti, he turned his back on the Americas. As E. J. Hobsbawm writes in The Age of Revolu-
tion: 1789-1848, 'The failure of Napoleonic France to recapture Haiti was one of the main
reasons for liquidating the entire remaining American Empire, which was sold by the Louisi-
ana Purchase (1803) to the U.S.A. Thus a further consequence . . . was to make the USA a
continent-wide power.' E.J. HOBSBAWN, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1788-1848, 69 (1962).
26. WILENZ, supra note 24, at 76. The colonizers of the world-France, Spain, Portu-
gal, England-feared the newly independent slaves and the youthful United States, whose
economy was still based on slavery, wanted nothing to do with the new republic. France hated
the Haitians who had defeated her-'gilded Negroes,' Napoleon had called them-and refused
to recognize Haiti.
27. Id. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 18.
'Toussaint's revolution,' Genovese observes "did not seek to turn the blacks of
Saint Dominque into Europeans but to lead them toward a recognition that Eu-
ropean technology had revolutionized the world and forced all people to partici-
pate in the creation of a world culture at once nationally varied and increasingly
uniform. From that moment, the slaves of the New World had before them the
possibility of a struggle for freedom that pointed towards participation in the
main-stream of world history rather than away from it.'
Haiti, however, found herself barred from participation in world commerce,
the all-important prerequisite for entry into world history, and it was the United
States more than any other nation that blocked her. By her audacity in freeing
her own slaves, and in defying every notion of black inferiority by defeating
three European giants, Haiti had committed the unpardonable sin. As Senator
Thomas Hart Benson remarked in 1826, 'We receive no mulatto cousuls or black
ambassadors from [Haiti]. And why? The peace of eleven states will not permit
the fruits of a successful Negro insurrection to be exhibited among them.', . .
Beginning with a trade embargo in 1806, the United States began a century
of commercial ostracism that sabotaged Toussaint's vision of an international
commercial orientation and forced Haiti's neck into an economic noose that
strangled bright hopes and pushed her further down the road to economic and
social catastrophe.
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Rather, they were viewed as a hybrid that was superior to the slave
class. Although some Mulatto children were treated in the same
fashion as their African brothers and sisters, some were endeared by
their French fathers who sent them to France for education and pro-
vided gifts of property and money. Often attaining greater civil
rights than the African, nevertheless the Mulattoes were subjected to
special laws which persecuted them under the caste system in this
society.28
B. Post-Colonization Era
The Republic of Haiti emerged as a segmented society.29 The
separation of classes was defined by language, education, religion,
and skin color in addition to economics. The elite comprised about
three percent of the population, looked to France for inspiration, and
shunned anything that remotely resembled Africa. The literate elite
spoke French while the masses spoke Creole.30 The elite dominated
such aspects of life in Haiti as commerce and governmental func-
tions. Further, they lived in the urban capital while the masses lived
in the rural parts of the country. The elite were practicing Catholics
while the masses continued to practice the African-based folk reli-
gion-voodoo. The French, and later the Americans, attempted to
wipe out voodoo but were unsuccessful. 31
C. Emergency of New Leaders
The development of a modern nation was the dream of Haiti's
28. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 13. Legislation was restrictive and vindicative. They
were pitted against the slaves, could not hold public office and deprived of most civil liberties
accorded whites. They could, however, own slaves and property. They assimilated the values,
manners, and culture of France, and disassociated themselves from the African. They were a
separate class from the African and the French slave owner.
29. H. SCHMIDT, THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION OF HAITI, 1915-1934 20-21 (1971)
[hereinafter SCHMIDT].
The free gens de color of colonial Saint Dominque, mostly mulattoes but also
including some blacks, had adopted the cultural values of dominant white
French society despite having been subjected to vicious racial "discrimination by
the whites .... White racist values ascribed status according to lightness of
skin pigmentation .... The physical norms of the dominant white segment of
French colonial society were carried over into independent Haiti by the gens de
color, who now constituted an educated elite among a large number of illiterate
former slaves.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 22.
Vodoun has served historically as a bulwark of Haitian folk culture and as a
rallying point for mass political action and resistance against foreign domination.
In colonial Saint Domingue, vodoun was the medium by which slaves main-
tained their common identity and conspirational liaisons .... The white
French clergy and later the American marines realizing the importance of
vodoun in the impervious resistance of the masses to foreign encroachments,
tried unsuccessfully to prevent ceremonies and outlaw vodoun.
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earlier leaders. However, without international or American support,
the continued battles to conquer the legacies of slavery were doomed
to failure. 32 Even with the advent of freedom, the separation of
Blacks and Mulattoes, illiteracy, social and political unrest, and eco-
nomic stagnation continued. Leaders came and went, each attesting
to the ideologies of their predecessors, such great leaders as Tous-
saint, Dessalines, and Christophe. The war had brought almost thir-
teen years of destruction to the land and the people.33
Christophe built upon the economic successes of Dessalines and
declared himself king. He was benevolent whereas Dessalines was
savage, evidenced by his support for the class divisions in Haiti.
Christophe ruled like a king and left a magnificent monument, the
Citadelle La Ferrierse, as a symbol of his reign of power. Unlike
Dessalines, he encouraged whites to assist in the development of the
country. He even employed the English educational system complete
with English teachers. 34
While Christophe ruled the Black-dominated North, Petion
ruled the mulatto-dominated south. While Toussaint, Dessalines and
Christophe continued the plantation system, which moved the coun-
try forward economical, Petion passed land legislation where labor-
ers became owners, and restored confiscated lands to the Mulattoes.
This marked the beginning of the end of Haitian agriculture. Petion
also lured Blacks from Christophe's hard driving north through the
easy going, although less economically sufficient south.
For the next twenty-five years, Petion's policies plunged Haiti
into abject misery and poverty. The Blacks who had worked the soil
now had only the army or servitude in the city as alternatives to an
impossible living condition. Mulattoes, due to their education, domi-
nated the civil service and controlled the economy and thus, effec-
tively shut out the Blacks.
Petion was succeeded by Boyer, who conquered the North after
Christophe's death. Boyer also conquered the remaining two-thirds
of the island and sought recognition of Haiti's independence from
32. Id. at 22-23. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 19.
33. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 19.
Like Toussaint Louverture before him, Jean-Jacques Dessalines took drastic
measures to reconstruct the ruined economy. Basically, he established a state
surfdom, where all men except a tiny group of administrators were either
soldiers or laborers'attached to a plantation,' as were all women. Because these
farmers were now freedmen, slavery's whip was abolished and the working day
was shortened . . . . Though many blacks ran away to the hills, most remained
and the plantations again flourished, with all French and white-owned lands ap-
propriated to the Haitian state. These constituted over two-thirds of all planta-
tions, so Dessalines's agricultural policy translated into full coffers for the state,
which rented out its huge landholdings to the highest bidders.
Id.
34. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 22.
Fall 19921
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France.
The country's socio-political and economic situation continued
on this track until a revolt in 1843 forced Boyer into exile. The re-
volt also signalled the end of Mulatto presidencies. The Blacks lead-
ers who. succeeded Boyer were either too old or infirm to contribute
to the success of the republic. 5
By the mid nineteenth century, President Lysus Salomon came
into power. He was the republic's last hope to put aside its corrup-
tion and violent ways. He did not succeed, and the other presidents
who followed maintained the status quo until the country was unsuc-
cessfully invaded by the Americans in 1915.
IV. Twentieth Century
A. The American Invasion
The late nineteenth century presented an opportune time in
American history to establish political and military control in the
Caribbean and the Pacific. During this period it was crucial for
America to demonstrate its capacity to compete as an industrial
power. The British, Germans,3" and French established colonies
throughout the world, thus providing the stimuli for the nascent im-
perial ambitions of the United States.37
Outwardly, America claimed that its desire to occupy Haiti was
to plant democratic liberalism. The underlying philosophy, however,
was two-pronged: (1) to promote the economic interests for Ameri-
35. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 25-26.
The only President of note was Soulouque.
Two years into his reign the event occurred that transformed Soulouque from a
minor and incompetent President into a personage known as 'Soulouque the Ig-
norant' . . . So in 1849, when the Virgin Mary appeared in downtown Port-
au-Prince and relayed God's desire that he become Emperor, Soulouque was
more than willing.
As Faustin, he and his Queen, Adelina, and an extensive court of instantly cre-
ated nobles, ruled for a decade, overthrown only in 1859 after destroying Haiti
with corruption, debt, debased currency, and a series of military defeats after
repeated attempts to recapture the Dominican Republic. Soulouque's legacy to
his successor was a country in even worse condition than when he had inherited
it, with its fundamental problems still unresolved, including its ruinous class/
caste structure, whereby blacks dominated the powerful army and mulattoes ran
the country, owned the land and controlled the economy.
Id.
36. "D" Confidential Tentative Plans for Employment of Naval Forces Stationed in
Haitian Ports - Port-au-Prince" (Ca. July 1914); NA, RG45, WA-7 Box 631, quoted in
SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 242.
See also concerning German involvement in Haitian Commerce - SD 838.00/1667, J.H.
Stabler to W.J. Bryan, May 13, 1914. Roger L. Farnham, vice president of National City
Bank, estimated that 90% of Haitian business was controlled by Germans on the eve of Amer-
ican intervention. Senate Hearings, 1922, at 110, quoted in SCHMIDT, supra note 29.
37. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 4. The construction of a modern fleet of ships, cou-
pled with the industrial revolution, permitted American to flex its muscles by military landings
in Formosa, Japan, Uruguay, Mexico, Korea, Columbia, Hawaii, Egypt, Haiti, Somoa, Argen-
tina, Chile, Nicaragua, and China.
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can investors and (2) to promote among the Haitians the philosophy,
espoused by Booker T. Washington in 1895,'called the Atlanta Com-
promise, which relied upon "abnegation of intellectual, cultural and
social aspirations for Blacks in favor of manual-technical education
and material betterment through efficient performance at low skill
trades. ' 38 Thus, this cornerstone of the American hard-line attitude
towards its own black citizens was simply transferred to the Haitian
occupation. America's total disregard for the pluralistic nature of
Haitian society struck a negative chord not only within the tradi-
tional Black community but to the overall society of Haiti.
Mulattoes, who retained their European orientation, were
shocked when contact was made by white American marines-who
treated all Haitians as "negroes" and made no distinction between
Blacks and Mulattoes, educated or not.3 9 This was the only time in
Haitian history where the younger generation, regardless of skin
color or status, embraced the cultural heritage of the African ances-
try. It was also during this period that young Francois Duvalier de-
veloped the concept of Noiriste by writing articles on Haitian ethnol-
ogy. He later emerged as a champion of this international concept.
Duvalier's logical writings would later serve as a basis for enforce-
ment of his political philosophy regarding the position of Blacks in
Haitian culture. The American occupation galvanized and solidified
the popularity of Duvalierism, which eventually resulted in brutality
and the loss of thousands of Haitian lives twenty years after the oc-
cupation ended.
Furthermore, America realized that the continued German
presence in Haiti was detrimental to its own interests in Haiti. The
Germans embraced the Haitians; the Germans married Haitians so
that their descendants could circumvent the property ownership
laws, and established themselves in finance and public utilities. The
Germans also influenced political life in Haiti by providing much
needed capital to finance revolutions. Investing in revolutions pro-
vided high rates of return for the German merchants who advanced
sizable loans to revolutionary causes in exchange for high rates of
interest, but failed to produce anything for the benefit of the Haitian
38. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 13, 14. "In Haiti the materialistic, technical pro-
gressive impulse was given free rein, since the human objects, Haitian 'Negroes" whose culture
was held in contempt, had no rights and were not permitted to interfere with the more enlight-
ened designs of the occupiers." Id. at 14. In American racial discrimination the term and
social category "Negro" included people of all proportions of Negroid ancestry while in Haiti
and elsewhere in Latin American important distinctions ,vere made between mulattoes and
Blacks. The United States applied its own racial idealogy in Haiti, disregarding Social
distinctions.
39. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 23. See also, N. DAVID, FROM DESSALINES TO
DUVALIER: RACE, COLOR AND NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IN HAITI (1979); R. HiENL & N.
HIENL, WRITTEN IN BLOOD: THE STORY OF THE HAITIAN PEOPLE 1492-1971 (1978).
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people. By the late 1890s, German and American rivalry in this
small nation reached its peak. The Americans obtained exclusive
competitive advantages for its own products. In response, "[t]he
Haitian government refused to lower its duties on American imports,
and the United States, in 1892, imposed retaliatory tariffs on Hai-
tian goods.,"
The McKinley administration took a different tactic of Ameri-
can product adaptation to the Haitian market 'and greater credit
terms. By 1920,41 the United States had cornered sixty percent of
the Haitian import market, thus replacing Germany as Haiti's sig-
nificant trading partner. This signalled the beginning of America's
intervention into Haiti, but more was to come. The Americans made
significant financial investments, the first of which was the develop-
ment of a railroad. The railroad concession, however, never material-
ized and was later taken over by the Germans after the Germans
successfully extorted "half a million dollars from the Haitian govern-
ment in 1901.42 The railroad concession debacles continued until the
American occupation. The American banking and investment inter-
ests merely used the Haitian government to make good on failed
contracts and poor quality work which did not result in a railroad for
the country. Further, American banking interests were drawn into
Haiti's internal fiscal affairs. Former president and scholar, Leslie F.
Manigot, argued that America predominated in "Haitian affairs by
defeating French and German interests in the 1910 struggle for con-
trol of the Banque Nationale. 43 This theory is supported by the
following:
[I]n 1905, following the discovery of extensive frauds, the Hai-
tian government had suspended the government treasury service
operated by the French-owned Banque. In November, 1909,
Speyer and Company and National City Bank sent a repre-
sentative to Haiti in an attempt to secure control of the Banque,
but the American firms were out-maneuvered by German inter-
est, represented by the German ambassador in Paris and the
German minister in Port-au-Prince, which were trying to reor-
ganize the Banque and negotiate a new loan to the Haitian gov-
ernment. The German interests cooperating with the French di-
rectors of the existing Banque, procured a contract for
reorganization of the Banque and flotation of a 65 million franc
loan. The bonds were taken by the Franco-German interests at
40. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 36.
41. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 36.
42. MONTAGUE. LUDWELL, & LEE, HAITI AND THE UNITED STATES: 1714-1938 199
(1940).
43. "La Substitution de la preponderance Americaine a la preponderance Francaise in
Haiti debut du xxe siecle: la conjuncture de 1910-1911," Revue d'historie moderne et con-
temporaine XIV 321-55 (Oct. - Dec. 1967).
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72.3 percent, while National City Bank later claimed that it had
offered 80 percent but had been turned down because of failure
to include graft. The contract for the reorganized Banque Na-
tionale provided that the Banque would have sole right of vote
issues and would serve as the government treasury, charging 1
percent on money received and 0.5 percent on money disbursed.
The Banque also retained 10 million francs of the loan as a re-
serve fund to redeem paper currency."44
By and large the foreign stance regarding Latin and Central
American financial exploitation culminated in foreign economic in-
terests using the loan process at exorbitantly high interest rates to
corrupt governments. Once a default on the loan payments occurred,
the foreign investor would apply to its government for assistance in
debt collection. Thus, the loans were repaid with high rates of re-
turns on very little progress because of the intervention by the inves-
tor's government. "5 The United States assumed the burden of polic-
ing Latin and Central America, thus protecting it against European
intervention. This new policy, espoused in the Roosevelt Corollary of
1904, served as a precedent for subsequent intervehtions." The
Americans were primarily concerned with the European financial
control of the Caribbean. Thus, the Monroe Doctrine was extended
to establish a new "Caribbean Policy," which was nationalistic in
scope rather than Pan American." World War I was in full swing at
44. See .SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 39. Also cited SD 838.51/81, Speyer & Co. to
Huntington Wilson, Aug. 12, 1910. SD 83851/72, M.E. Ailes, representing National City
Bank, to Knox, June 4, 1910. See also SD 838.51/74 H.M. Hoyt to Huntington Wilson, July
6, 1910.
See also Memorandum "Banque Nationale de-la Republique d'Haiti;" submitted to the
Forbes Commission by National City Bank on Feb. 12, 1930; Forbes Commission Papers, Box
1 1910 Banque contract. See SD 838.00/1377.
"The State Department, objecting to plainly unconscionable exploitation of the Haitian
government and to the absence of American participation, refused to sanction the contract. In
response to state Department objections, the Franco-German interests agreed to 50 percent
American participation and control of the New Banque. Schmidt, supra note 27, at 39.
45. The loan default syndrome also led to American intervention in Dominican Repub-
lic. See M. KNIGHT, THE AMERICANS IN SANTO DOMINGO v-xi (1928).
46. SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 44.
The new policy manifested itself in American concern for order and stability in
the internal affairs of Caribbean countries, since stable governments were capa-
ble of the efficiency and responsibility necessary for the paying off of debts,
while'unstable transient governments tended to be irresponsible in paying debts,
unresponsive to America diplomatic pressures and corrupt enough to contract
new, exorbitant loans with foreign investors.
47.
The opposition to European control over American territory is not primarily to
preserve the integrity of any American state ... The essential idea is to prevent
a condition which would menace the national interests of the United States ... I
make no argument on the ground of the benefit which would result to the peo-
ples of these republics by the adoption of this policy.
Lansing Memorandum, "Present Nature and Extent of the Monroe Doctrine and Its Need Of
Restatement," June II and Nov. 24, 1915; From THE LANSING PAPERS, 1914-1920, II, 460-
470, quoted in SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 59.
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this point, and the Americans were fearful that the German subma-
rines might come over to the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico and
sink American tankers on their way to Europe. Had the Germans
been successful in establishing a base in Haiti and won the war, the
United States position in the Caribbean would have been seriously
threatened.
The best approach for America was to obtain a customs receiv-
ership. In essence, in a receivership status, the financially-troubled
nation relinquishes its sovereignty to another country. In addition,
the United States wanted the Haitians to agree to cession of Mole-
Saint-Nicholas, a strategic position for naval operations in the Car-
ibbean."' The Haitian government agreed to the receivership, but de-
manded economic concessions for their guarantees not to alienate the
Mole to any foreign power. The U.S. State Department, however,
was not satisfied.
These were insufficient to placate the State Department, which,
by November, 1914, was demanding: (1) a customs convention;
(2) settlement of claims made against the Haitian government
by the American railroad; (3) settlement of claims made by the
Banque Nationale; (4) full protection of foreign interests; and
(5) the guarantee not to alienate the Mole."9
Negotiations continued during the early part of 1915, but to no
avail. The ,only alternative was direct American intervention. The
United States decided that a "resident adviser," similar to the same
type of governance that had been employed by the Netherlands in
Java and the British in India, would be the best method of control.5 0
The overthrow of Haitian President Vilburn Guillaume Sam, in
July 1915, presented the United States with the opportunity it had
been waiting for since July 1914. Under the guise of humanitarian-
48. The Mole was viewed as a potential coaling station and naval base.
At the outset the Wilson Administration wanted the Mole as an American base,
as had several previous administrations. In 1913 Bryan suggested and Wilson
approved a plan by which the United States would procure the Mole and a strip
of land 20 miles long and 10 miles wide extending into the interior ... By this
time, however, the Navy Department, which already had an excellent base
across the Windward Passage as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, had come to regard
the Mole as obsolete and superfluores for its own purposes, but insisted that no
other nation be permitted to acquire it.
Bryan to Wilson, Apr. 3, 1915; Na, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence. Bryan June 23, 1913; Na
Bryan Wilson Correspondence. See also Bryan to Wilson, June 14, 1913; quoted in R. BAKER
& W. WILSON, LIFE AND LETTERS: 1915-1917, VI 87 (1937). See also SD 838.00/1668, Sta-
bler. memorandum, May 14, 1914, quoted in SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 56.
49. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 61.
50. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 62. See also Bryan to Wilson, Apr. 3, 1915, NA,
Bryan-Wilson Correspondence, Id. at 248. Further, little consideration was given to the rights
of the Haitian people regarding self determination. SCHMIDT, supra. at 62-63.
"Department officials, confident of American superiority and reflecting the racial
prejudices of the period, tended to disparage Haitian achievements and capabilities, as had
most foreign observers throughout Haitian history." Id.
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ism, the prevention of anarchy and bloodshed, the United States had
a basis for intervention.51 Yet, the hypocrisy of the United States
position to maintain decency and morality was readily apparent in
its treatment of a Black man in a southern town who was dragged
from a jail and burned alive in the town square. 52
Once the American military was in control, it developed the
machinery of political control. At first, the United States decided to
elect a client-president who could be controlled by the Americans
and thus lead to effective control of the Haitian Congress and ad-
ministrative officers. It initially decided that Rosalvo Bobo would be
the next President.53 Bobo had misgivings about the American inter-
vention, however, and was thus ruled out as a likely candidate. The
United States approached several other prominent Haitian politi-
cians, but all declined the offer. The president of the Haitian Senate,
Phillipe Sudre Dartiquenave, however, eagerly offered his services if
the Americans would guarantee his protection. In the final analy-
sis, Washington wanted Dartiquenave and the Haitian legislature
elected him on August 12, 1915. Within a month after the elections,
the United States declared martial law in Haiti. In addition, free-
dom of the press was suspended; any publication against the United
States or Haiti would not be tolerated. 5 Martial law continued until
the riots and strikes of 1929. Thus, the Americans had effected the
military occupation, now controlled all custom houses and govern-
mental revenues (through the receivership), had a puppet for a Pres-
ident, and finally had a unilateral treaty that justified the occupation
and gave the United States far more than it had initially bargained
for. "The addition included the appointment of an all powerful finan-
cial adviser by the President of the United States, establishment of a
51. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 248. See also Office of Naval Intelligence Register
No. 4801A, "Haiti and Santo Domingo - Plan of Occupation," Oct. - Dec. 1914, NA, RG 45,
WA - 7, box 633, and SD 838.00/1426, Stabler to Lansing, Aug. 5, 1915.
52. DANTE, BELLGARDE. L'OCCUPATION AMERICANE D'HAITI: SES CONSEQUENCES
MORALES ECONOMIQUE (Port-au-Prince: Imp. Cheraquit, 5 (1929). Bellearde compares the
atrocities visited upon American Blacks by their own countrymen and the barbarity of the
United States.
In Congress the debate regarding intervention described the similarity of presidential as-
sassinations in each country. American assassinations of Presidents since 1862 to 1915 had
been identical to Haitian Presidential assassinations. Furthermore the French had 11 govern-
ments in Haiti between the years of 1909-1914.
53. Bobo had been in charge of the caco army that successfully overthrew President
Sam. Thus, it was seen as a natural evolution to reward Bobo with the presidency. However, in
spite of the fact that he held degrees in law and medicine from the Universities of Paris and
London, his stance in opposing the American encroachment in Haiti was seen as a negative to
United States interests.
54. Dartiquenave sold out his country by agreeing to offer the United States financial
control and customs receivership and offered to cede Mole-Saint-Nicholas outright . . . Darti-
quenave also made specific commitments to settle outstanding difficulties between the Haitian
government and the Banque nationale and to pay the various claims made against the govern-
ment by the American owned national railway. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 72.
55. Censorship Promulgation of Sept. 3, 1915; Senate Hearings, 1922, at 70.
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constabulary organized and officered by Americans, settlement of
foreign claims, and American control of public works."56
An American-sponsored Constitution was drafted and enacted
in 1918 and the Haitian legislature granted the extension of the Hai-
tian-American treaty for 20 years. An important feature of the new
Constitution was a provision that permitted alien landownership,
which provided a mechanism for American investment. Ultimately,
the Haitian occupation became a campaign issue during the 1920
U.S. Presidential campaign. While President Wilson touted the self
determination line regarding Latin American, the United States con-
tinued to occupy Haiti. This campaign issue reached its peak when
the New York Times reported that American Marines had commit-
ted atrocities against the Haitian population."
In 1922, the election of a new client-president, Louis Borno,
brought the appointment of a High Commissioner, General Russell.
The High Commissioner was the American President's personal rep-
resentative in Haiti. In essence, he was likened to the British High
Commissioner during the English occupation in Egypt from 1882-
1914. Borno, another "selected" President agreed with the analogy
often made between American control in Haiti and British control in
Egypt. 58
56. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 75.
The treaty provided that the United States would aid Haiti in economic develop-
ment and establish Haitian finances on a firm basis. An American-appointed
financial adviser and general receiver of customs would have extensive control
over Haitian government finances, and Haiti was forbidden to modify its cus-
toms duties or increase its public debt without United States approval. The
United States would organize and officer a Haitian army and the Haitian gov-
ernment agreed to execute an arbitration protocol with the United States for
settlement of foreign claims. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years
from the date of exchange of ratification, which was May 3, 1916. Efforts by the
Dartiquenave government to participate effectively in the drafting of the treaty
were thwarted. A later State Department memorandum noted that 'The Haitian
Government attempted to make it appear that this treaty had been negotiated
rather than dictated and suggested several changes in phraseology,' but the de-
partment had insisted on its own phraseology.
Id. at 77.
See also SD 838.00/2484 "Intervention in Haiti," Division of Latin American Affairs
memorandum, unsigned, Feb. 11, 1927.
57. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1920, at 17.
How American Marines largely made up of and officered by Southerners,
opened fire with machine guns from airplanes upon defenseless Haitian villages,
killing men, women and children in the open market place, how natives were
slain for 'sport' by a hoodlum element among these same Southerners; and how
the ancient covery system of enforced labor was revised and ruthlessly executed,
increasing, through retaliation, the banditry in Haiti and Santo Domingo, was
told yesterday by Henry A. Franch, the noted traveller and authority on the
West Indies.
id.
58. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 126. "United States control over Haiti was essential
to the security of the Panama Canal just as British control in Egypt was necessary to protect
the Suez Canal." Id.
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The occupation continued without much interest on the part of
the American government in Washington until the strikes and riots
of 1929. As commonly occurred in colonial or occupied countries,
Haitians were not promoted to positions of power or responsibility.
The political base of the puppet President was never put into place,
and the racial attitudes of the Americans fostered only hostility and
criticism from the Haitian population. The upcoming scheduled
withdrawal of American troops in 1936 did not hasten the need for
Haitians to participate in preparation for self-government. If the
people were allowed to vote, Americans feared that the Haitians
would vote against those who supported the American occupation.
Thus the battle cry of the occupiers was that Haitians were too igno-
rant to vote and elections would provide a forum for the expression
of anti-American sentiments. As indicated by the chief of the Divi-
sion of Latin American affairs:
It is very doubtful, furthermore, whether an election held at pre-
sent would have any appreciable value in training the Haitian
people for self-government. The masses of voters are still too ig-
norant and too much out of touch with the world. A continuance
for a relatively short time of the development work now in pro-
gress, including the opening of roads and trails and the educa-
tion of the peasants in the new rural schools, will work great
change in this respect. 9
The fall of 1929 brought an end to the Haitian complacency
that had existed for 14 years. The coffee market collapsed, the gov-
ernment attempted to raise taxes, the client-President Borno indi-
cated a willingness to serve another four year term, and American
condescension was rampant. Students at Service Technique, the agri-
cultural college, organized a strike because of the reduction in incen-
tive scholarships. They were soon joined by students from the medi-
cal and law schools as well as students from private and public
schools. The High Commissioner, Russell, dismissed the strikes as
"petty student's affairs."6 The strikes quickly spread to customs
workers in Port-au-Prince. The High Commissioner reacted by in-
voking martial law and curfews, and the uprising attracted world-
wide attention. The only alternative was to act quickly to remove
American troops from Haitian soil and to transfer control back to
the Haitians.6" President Hoover assembled the Forbes Commission
59. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 193. It is interesting to note that although the
Americans continued to assess the Haitian as ignorant, it made no effort to reduce illiteracy or
to educate voters on democratic principles and ideas.
60. Id.
61. See SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 207. "The major barrier to early American with-
drawal was not concern over having adequate time to transfer treaty services ... to compe-
tent Haitians but rather the problem of satisfying commitments to American bondholders who
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which conducted investigations into the uprisings and subsequent
treatment of the Haitian people by the Marines. The Commission
found that "the preparation for the political and administrative
training of Haitians in the responsibilities of government had been
inadequate.""5
Public disorders continued after the departure of the Forbes
Commission. In April 1930, Stenio Vincent was selected as provi-
sional president and remained in office until the following November.
Although the Americans were anxious to leave Haiti, the question of
the U.S. remaining in control of Haiti's finances was still unresolved.
President Vincent, in an effort to get rid of the Americans, signed an
agreement allowing American supervision of Haiti's fiscal operations
until 1952. On August 21, 1934 the American flag was lowered all
over Haiti. Aside from the humiliation that often accompanied an
occupation by another country, such an experience had afforded the
residents important technological improvements such as, roads, auto-
mated telephone exchanges in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitian, med-
ical facilities, and a stable monetary supply. Like most occupiers, the
Americans failed to change the infrastructure and thus, most of the
improvements did not survive. The institution that did survive the
occupation was a highly trained and efficient army. The army would
control and topple Haitian presidents for decades until Duvalier
found a method to outsmart and dominate the army. Politically, the
occupation united the country through the development of the con-
cept called noirisme, a black-based political thought that formed an
entire intellectual generation with self pride in the wake of oppres-
sive caucasian racism.
V. Haiti After the Occupation
A. The Rule of Francois Duvalier
Dr. Francois Duvalier's first political position, under secretary
for labor, came from his noiriste mentor, President Estime. Duvalier
was profoundly influenced by Estime because of Duvalier's concern
for the masses. In his first political treatise, Problem of Classes,
"Duvalier turned to the past not to laud its treasures but to buttress
his strident foregone conclusions about Haiti's racial relations.""a
Duvalier claimed that the ruling class refused to leave the country
because of their arrogance and money. He felt that they were totally
derelict in their responsibility to the country and even fought against
insisted on continued American financial control." Id.
62. U.S. Department of State, Report of the President's Commission for Study and
Review of Condition in the Republic of Haiti, 1930. Reprinted in Fr, 1930, III, 217-37, cited
in SCHMIDT, supra note 29, at 212.
63. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 57.
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social justice. In 1956, Duvalier emerged as a presidential candidate.
Duvalier's strategy was to campaign under the noiriste slogan, to en-
courage the female vote and to present himself as a person of integ-
rity and sincerity. Furthermore, his prior work with the masses years
before brought thousands more votes.
Duvalier, commonly referred to as Papa Doc, won the election
handily after ballot boxes had been stuffed, hospitalized people co-
erced and children counted as viable votes. From the onset of his
Presidency, Duvalier attempted to insure his power by eliminating
his opponents. Duvalier spent the rest of his life obsessed with power
and subduing his countrymen. Duvalier's first heart attack "trans-
formed him into a man who lacked mental balance, a dictator who,
Hitler-like, would suddenly rant and rave and foam at the mouth
like a true lunatic astonishing and horrifying onlookers."', Duvalier
surrounded himself with his uneducated and loyal military po-
lice-the TonTon Macontes who carried out his atrocities to the let-
ter.6 5 Duvalier also embraced the voodoo religion and its priests and
raised the religion to heights of legitimacy it had never before
enjoyed. 6
The Cuban revolution in 1957-58 provided the perfect backdrop
that solidified Duvalier's relationship with America. As insane as his
regime may have been, "Americans were prepared to overlook tor-
ture, murder, and disappearances and listen with eager ears to reas-
suring speeches about democracy, human rights, and unmitigated
anticommunism.6 7 Additionally, the exodus of the educated class
drove out thousands of productive Haitians who opposed the regime.
Thus, the greatest brain drain in Haitian history occurred during the
Duvalier years. What remained was a frightened, illiterate popula-
tion, controlled by the fear of voodoo and the TonTon Macontes.
This regime of terror continued until Duvalier's death on April 21,
1971.
B. The Rule of Jean-Claude Duvalier
Jean-Claude Duvalier, the President's only son had led a
charmed life insulated from the heinousness of his father's activities.
Although he appeared to be the heir apparent, he was not anxious to
assume his father's mantle of power. It was far more logical for his
more politically astute sister Marie-Denise to become the new presi-
dent. But since she was a woman, she could not carry on the family
name. Consequently, Jean-Claude Duvalier had little choice but to
64. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 97-98.
65. See ABBOTT, supra note 18. at 86-87.
66. See ABBOTT, supra, note 18, at 81-82.
67. See ABBOTT, supra note 18,"at 100.
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assume power upon his father's death.
Jean-Claude was in shock and so mentally distraught by his fa-
ther's death that he had to be sedated and missed his father's fu-
neral. Jean-Claude's reluctance to his accession as President resulted
from his inability to cope with the responsibilities of the office for
which he had never been prepared. The mantle of the presidency
meant that he would be deprived of all the pleasures he loved-
sports, partying, and womanizing. Additionally, Jean-Claude was not
known for mental acuity. Thus, the entire experience was one he pre-
ferred to do without. There was no one else, however, and although
the country had lost Duvalier it had not lost Duvalerism. He man-
aged to leave the administration of his office to his domineering
mother, Simone.
Jean-Claude's nonchalant and nonthreatening demeanor re-
sulted in better relations with the Americans who increased aid, in-
creased tourism, and the return of exiled Haitians who felt more se-
cure in their homeland than in the past 24 years of Papa Doc's rule.
Although on the outside things seemed to take a turn for the better,
inside the Duvalier legacy of corruption was in total control of the
nation's treasury, and the family continued to divert money from the
national coffers to their Swiss bank accounts.68
Haiti's darling, commonly referred to as Baby Doc, continued to
charm the outside world, but in 1980 the domestic situation peaked
when the Bahamian government notified Haitian authorities about
the boat people who had illegally emigrated to their country. Some
900-1500 Haitians were in Nassau's Fox Hill prison, and the Hai-
tian government did nothing. People continued to leave Haiti, and
one night a tragedy occurred that rocked the nation. On September
22, 1980, 116 Haitian men, women, and children who could no
longer take the poverty set sail on a derelict boat for Miami. The
captain deposited his passengers on Cayo Lobos, a deserted island off
the Bahamas. They remained on the island without food, water or
supplies until a man swam out to sea, was rescued by a fisherman
and led authorities to rescue the others. On October 23, 1980, the
Bahamian authorities returned him to Haiti where he gave a horrify-
ing account of the incident on a television show and on several radio
stations .9
This tragedy was a breaking point. Haitian Journalist Gregoire
Eugene launched a direct and bitter assault on Jean-Claude's gov-
ernment and was eventually exiled. This was the beginning of the
Baby Doc crackdown. He stripped the country of all of its most out-
spoken critics. Duvalier, however, made his most fatal mistakes by
68. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 170.
69. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 234.
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marrying mulatto Michele Bennett which violated the canons of the
noiriste philosophy. He further fueled dissension by alienating the
army, an act he would live to regret. Older supporters of his father
were appalled by the scandalous activities in the palace. It was the
military that plotted to overthrow Duvalier not the people as was the
popular myth of the day."
C. Chaos Rules in the 1980s
On April 7, 1986, Jean-Claude Duvalier left Haiti on an Ameri-
can cargo plane headed for France. One of the conspirators, General
Henri Namphy, was appointed President of the provisional govern-
ment. The Haitian sentiment was that they were finally rid of their
dictator and would now rebuild the country through democracy.
This, however, would remain a dream deferred.7 1 Haiti has had sev-
eral interim presidents both from the military and civilian sector and
yet, the country has not settled its problem of governance. In early
1990, after several others rejected the presidency, a woman, Ertha
Pascal Trouillot was selected to head the interim government until
elections were held that fall .7  The winner in the elections was Presi-
dent Aristide, who was ousted in September 1991. Artistide was re-
placed by Joseph Nerette, who has served as Haiti's provisional
president.
In addition, various efforts to reinstate Aristide have been un-
successful. Shortly after Aristide was ousted, the Organization of
American States (OAS) instituted an international trade embargo
that was to invoke economic hardship on those initiating the coup.
The embargo, however, has not affected those intended and has had
the most profound impact on the poor, costing Haiti an estimated
140,000 jobs.73  Further, in February 1992, the OAS brokered an
70. See ABBOTT, supra note 18, at 284-85.
Alix Cineas returned to the cabinet, but his personal reflections during his seven-
teen months in disgrace had transformed him from a loyal Duvalierist to a secret
dissident committed to ousting Jean-Claude. . . .He had discussed with a few
close friends the scandalous goings-on in the palace, where the President-for-Life
and the First Lady took drugs and cheated on each other. He had watched with
growing incredulity as the Bennett family and their cronies tore the country
apart ....
[H]e was convinced that Haiti could be saved only if it could be rid of Jean-
Claude Duvalier and the Bennetts . . . .Unlike his colleagues who had staked
their political existences on Jean- Claude's continuing in power, Cineas had cast
his lot with a growing circle of civilian and military dissidents actively working
to force Jean-Claude out.
7 1. The people turned from celebration to destruction. The hated TonTon Macontes now
became the focus of Dechoukaj. In Creole it means to uproot a tree. The populace was deter-
mined not only to rid the country of Duvalier's notorious guard but also Duvalierism. For a
detailed description see WILENTZ, supra note 24, at 53-62.
72. Rupert, Haiti's Leader Has Hopes For Elections, WASH. POST, May 26, 1990, at
A26.
73. Hockstader, Opponents of Aristide Put Resolution of Haitian Crisis in Doubt,
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agreement between Aristide and legislative leaders that would have
recognized Aristide's authority and installed a prime minister of his
choice in return for an end to the OAS-initiated embargo.7' The Na-
tional Assembly, however, failed to approve the agreement, and on
March 27, 1992, Haiti's Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the
agreement was unconstitutional and could not be ratified by the Hai-
tian parliament.7"
While Nerette, a former Supreme Court justice, was installed
after the coup, the Nerette government has not been recognized by
the international community.76 As a result, the Haitian government
is still operating in a chaotic state and does not have in place a
strong rule of law.
VI. The Significance of Rules
An autonomous individual is one who is rational and free -with
respect to his own conduct. Rationality and freedom when taken to-
gether confer moral responsibility for one's behavior. Thus, as de-
scribed by Kant, people are self-legislating beings who act in accor-
dance to laws that are derived from their own reason. The newly
freed Haitian slave in 1804 lacked this requisite freedom. This was
further exacerbated by a lack of a government model. Slavery was
replaced with self promotion. In analyzing the political climate of
the time, those governed were governed by force and fear. Thus, the
slave mentality persisted, and the individual continued to be one who
was not self-legislated. 77 Further, the body politic had no mutual
consent between men to maintain a government. From 1804 to the
present, Haiti has been a country governed by men who enacted and
enforced their own laws as they saw fit. Government in its purest
sense is in fact the coercion through threat and force of the many by
a few.78 The revolt of the slaves could be characterized as a "nega-
WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 1992, at A21.
74. Id.
75. Slavin, Court Rejects Pact for Aristide's Return, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 1992, at
Al.
76. Id.
77. R. TAYLOR, FREEDOM, ANAYCHY, AND THE LAW 48 (1973).
78. It is interesting to note that the emergence of the
continental European police systems came to be so highly centralized and came
to be associated with the repressive violence of autocratic monarchical regimes.
Their legitimacy wag derived from the traditional legitimacy of the sovereign
• .. for economic success, that is to pay prosperity, has been a legitimizing
ground for centuries and in many kinds of societies.
Cited in C.J. FRIEDRICH. THE PATHOLOGY OF POLITICS 22 (1972).
The continental police can be analogized to the Tonton Macontes of the Duvalier era who
existed for the good of the leader not the people. The situation continues with the Macontes
existing in a state of anarchy because they no longer have a leader to legitimize their actions,




tive revolution" because of the rejection of the old order (as repres-
sive as it was) and the failure to provided an adequate replacement
for a new order. The continuation of revolutions and coup d'etats in
Haitian history merely served as the foundation for the eventuality
of the military dictatorship of Duvalier. 9 Although the overthrow of
the dictatorship provided a perfect opportunity for change, it has
merely fostered fractionalization among the various political groups.
Additionally, the lack of a strong central figure (such as Castro in
Cuba) has left the country politically adrift. The effective political
order did not come simply because the dictator was forced out.
Again, Haiti is in the same predicament in 1992 as it was in 1804: it
has removed the master but has failed to decide internally what will
be the replacement."0
If a government is to be successful, there must be a moral basis
for legal order. Whenever this moral basis is lacking, and conse-
quently justification is lacking, the government is merely a group of
people who rule by sheer force. In order for there to be a viable
government, "the governed" will assume that the legal order is justi-
fied because the laws and the judicial apparatus that manages them
contain certain general principles of morality, such as respect for
human life, the rights of the individual, and the sanctity of property
and fairness. The quality of the legal order turns on the governmen-
tal protection which promotes and upholds justice and morality."
The political power comes from the people and legitimizes the gov-
ernment. Based on Rousseau's theory of social contract, popular con-
sent is given by the people to the government. Rousseau believed
that at one time people did live without government and were gov-
erned by natural law in the natural state."2 The question then is
79. S. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES, 1968, cited in FRIED-
RICH, supra note 73.
80. FRIEDRICH, supra note 73, at 5. Every political order is subject to change, and unless
means are provided for adaptation of the institutions and processes to such changes as occur in
the social substructure, such change will lead to violence, either sporadic, as in much resis-
tance, or all-engulfing, as in political revolution.
81. The notion of justice and morality have been the subject of philosophers throughout
the ages. Plato thought that the right to rule coincides with the degree of philosophical acumen
necessary for the understanding of justice. Locke and others of his era posited that men have
certain natural rights which government must respect and protect. See also A.C PEGR'SED,
SUMMA THEOLOGIC, THE BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS (1945); R.C.
MACRIDIS, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES (1986).
82. BARADAT, POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES-THEIR ORIGINS AND IMPACT 47 (1988).
Hobbs, Locke and Rousseau agreed on many points and differed in others. They
agreed that the individual should be free, but they disagreed on the definition of
freedom. The conservative Hobbs made a significant contribution to the develop-
ment of democracy by supporting the notion that political power comes from the
people and by insisting on the separation of church and state. Even so, he be-
lieved that the evil nature of people mode them prisoners of their own greed
S. .  The liberal Locke, on the other hand, thoughts that because people were
basically good, freedom was greatest when the individual was left alone. The
radical Rousseau believed that people were timid and peaceful in the state of
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what has stymied the Haitian republic from developing into a mod-
ern nation?
The problem is two fold: first, the mistrust of the people in the
government since there is in fact no strong central government that
can provide safety and a finite safeguard of the rule of law; second,
the attempts to establish a democracy in a country that is ninety
percent illiterate is an impossible feat. The time has come to reevalu-
ate the governmental and ideological concept called democracy vis a'
vis a third world country such as Haiti, an underdeveloped newly
free country which views traditional democracy with unrealistic ex-
pectations. The people, through the media, know how other people
live and expect that democracy will be. the magic wand that will
provide them typical standards of living enjoyed by other democrati-
cally ruled countries right away! It is a revolution of the raising ex-
pectations syndrome. The expectations escalate at a faster rate than
the institution can handle; consequently, loss of confidence in the in-
stitution results. If Haiti is to wipe away decades of inactivity, cor-
ruption, illiteracy, health care problems, and housing shortages, it
must parcel out democracy in stages. New services are required and
new institutions must be somehow overhauled and recreated to
achieve this goal. Simply holding elections is not enough. To achieve
long lasting peace and prosperity, Haiti must first reestablish the
rule of law, and the governed must legitimize the government. Then,
and only then, will there be an atmosphere whereby the first step
towards the establishment of a democracy can occur.
It is also at this point that a call should go out to those Haitians
that have fled the country to return to provide expertise in order to
get the country moving again. This can only be achieved if the gov-
ernment assures the safety of these people. It is also at this point
that the government should proclaim Haiti a neutral state and ban
weapons of any kind in the country for a period of years.
VII. Haitian Political Policy
Haiti presents a special case in the historical evolution of the
Caribbean because it was the first country to successfully revolt
against the white plantocracy. The newly-emancipated slaves had
only two models for governance: the plantation and the tribe. The
new leadership imposed no new social order. The people rebelled
nature. They became greedy only after they entered a society that had become
perverted by private property. Freedom from the captivity of their own passion
could be achieved only through the creation of a new society where equality was
the dominant principle . . . . While Hobbs held that the monarch was this au-




against slavery and replaced it with nothing. Moreover, external help
was not forthcoming from the other European countries and the
emerging American republic which maintained slavery within its
borders. Thus, Haiti bobbed and weaved through history with only
corrupt leadership and a serious internal color-caste problem which
plagues it to this day.
As previously mentioned, the Americans took an interest in the
late nineteenth century due to paranoia of European expansion into
the Caribbean and South America. America's chauvinism reached
its peak with the occupation of Haiti, and later the fear of commu-
nism brought with it support to any dictator who cried "communist
insurgency" regardless of what cost may be borne by the citizenry.
Francois Duvalier was a master at crying the "communist wolf" to
the United States whenever it was practical and when his coffers
were running low. Duvalier's experience during the American occu-
pation shaped the noiriste philosophy that had it been presented in a
positive fashion would have brought the country to a new philosoph-
ically developed level. Instead, it exiled the educated class and con-
sumed the country in an atmosphere of fear and chaos. Duvalier's
policies, and Americas support of them, further catapulted the coun-
try into economic, political, educational, and social decline. His
death in 1971 was not a reprieve to corruption but a continuation of
it in the form of his heir to the presidential chair-Jean-Claude. Al-
though the violence was somewhat subdued, the wholesale and bla-
tant theft of the government's coffers by the family continued.
The exile of Jean-Claude Duvalier and his family in 1986 was
to be the final chapter in dictatorial politics and a new beginning for
the ravaged country. However, Haitian blood continues to be shed,
and political unrest is the only constant. Since the exit of Jean
Claude, Haiti has had six presidents: General Namphy, President
Manigat, General Avirl', President Ertha Pascal Trouillot (who ac-
cepted the position after three other men turned it down), President
Aristide, and Joseph Nerette. Further, before Aristide was elected in
1991, such efforts always ended in violence and turmoil.
Perhaps by expecting a country to go from a dictatorship to a
democracy in one step is asking too much. Furthermore, Haiti is at a
crossroads in its development; if the next step is not taken to do
something constructive to move it into the twentieth century, it may
never happen. America must realize that it cannot continue to dic-
tate what should be done.83 The "American Plan"-the buzzword in
83. See WILENTZ, supra note 24, at 271-2.
In 1941, the United States and Haiti began a cooperative venture called the
Societe' Haitiano-Americaine de Developpement Agricole (SHADA) the Hai-
tian-American Company for Agriculture Development, a prototypical aid project
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Haiti-now has two strategies for development: the displacement of
the rural population to work in United States industries in the urban
areas, and a restructed agriculture that is owned by United States
nationals.84 However noble the intent to provide more low paying
jobs for the masses, this approach misses the mark. While it is true
that Haitians need jobs, they also need education, better health care,
and decent shelter. A 1985 World Bank Report entitled "Haiti: Pol-
icy Proposals for Growth" advised:
[T]he Haitian government-and, by extension, foreign-aid do-
nors-to cut back on social and health programs and use the
monies thus saved to build up infrastructure. In a chapter called
"The Way Forward" the World Bank suggests that "capital ex-
penditure not essential to increasing output . . .should be re-
duced and should be stabilized in the case of health and the
social components within rural development projects . . .,
There are clear cultural and political traditions that stand in the
way of progress and stabilization in Haiti. Further, the association of
democracy with capitalism is not generally accepted in Haiti as the
solution to its problems."a The deprivation and humiliation of slavery
run by Americans who ignored the protests of responsible Haitian experts. Fi-
nanced by an Export-Import Bank loan of $5 million and later the recipient of
another $7 million in U.S. credit, SHADA proposed to raise sisal and rubber
.. .SHADA was a bold project, and the Haitian government, also ignoring the
indigenous experts, did everything it could to help implement the plans of the
American agronomist who had developed the idea . . . .In the end, according
to the summary in Written in Blood and in other reports of the SHADA deba-
cle, some forty thousand families were kicked off their property, although the
project never cultivated even half of that land. For four years, SHADA had
managed more than 5 percent of Haiti's finest agricultural lands, yet when the
project was over, only five tons of rubber-a scandalously low return-had been
harvested.
Id.
84. See WILENZ, supra note 24, at 282.
DeWind and Kinley point out in its 1982 Country Development Strategy State-
ment, USAID anticipates that such a drastic reorientation of agriculture will
cause a decline in income and nutritional status, especially for small farmers and
peasants . . . .Even if transition to export agriculture is successful, AID antici-
pates a 'massive' displacement of peasant farmers and migration to urban
centers.
Id.
85. See WILENZ, supra note 24, at 274. The report goes on to state, "temporarily, less
emphasis should be placed on social objectives which increase consumption, since the urgent
need is to free a major share of GDP (gross domestic product) growth for export." On the
subject of education, it states, "Education ...is essential to long-term development. In the
short-term, however, it is a cost. This cost is necessary but should be miminized . . . .Thus,
social objectives should be more strictly related to economic growth ...and private sector
participation in the achievement of social objectives should be pursued where possible." This
represents the classic trickle-down theory that simply does not work in the United States and
certainly not in Haiti.
86. See WILENZ, supra note 24, at 275-76. A conversation with ousted President Aris-
tide, an anti-Duvalerist Catholic Priest revealed the following:
You want to make sure it [an investment] gives you the best rate of return:
stability and profit, in the case of the U.S. in Haiti. This is normal, capitalist
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imposed by the French, occupation by the Americans, the dictator-
ship of the Duvaliers, and the continuation of the Tonton Macontes,
have left Haiti in continuous chaos and turmoil.
8 7
A fresh approach is sorely needed. This can be accomplished by
1) the return of duly-elected President Aristide to the country, 2) the
building of viable coalitions from all power groups to govern with the
President for a specified time, say five years, 3) the removal of guns
from the country, for a period of five years, the arrest and conviction
of the TonTon Macoutes and the further dismantling of this power-
ful group, 5) a massive educational project to educate the majority
of the citizenry, and 6) a peace-keeping group to oversee and insure
an orderly movement to a new governmental order. Without a con-
certed effort to stabilize this country, the desperation of the people
will only continue to escalate and desperate measures will continue
to be employed as they flee to American shores. We do have a vested
interest to curtail the misery.
behavior, and I don't care if the U.S. wants to do it at home. You can do
whatever you want in your own home, right? But it is monstrous to come down
here and impose your will on another people. Why should we advance the way
you want us to advance? I understand the reality of the geographical situation,
and the geopolitical situation, but I cannot accept that Haiti should be whatever
the United States wants it to be . . . but one thing Haitians have made clear
from Dessalines to Duvalier, good and bad alike, is that we do not bow to the
will of other nations. We may pretend to, but we don't. We've never been a
client state.
Id.
87. What Can the U.S. really do About Haiti?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1987, Sec. 4, Page
2.
What the United States said it wanted for the impoverished and largely literate
population of that country was the first free election in 30 years. When the bal-
loting was canceled by attacks on polling places... there was a rush to debate
what went wrong and whether the American ability to influence events in that
region had been reduced. But a larger question that was underlined in Haiti is
how long the United States can go in manipulating the affairs of other countries.
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